Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...) can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

Der wissenschaftliche Diskurs soll zugleich „epistemisch gerecht“ und „epistemisch offen“ sein. Alle potentiell Erkennenden sollen die gleiche Freiheit haben, am Diskurs teilzunehmen, und dabei freimütig sprechen können. Auf diese Weise wird Wissen bzw. Erkenntnis bestmöglich erreicht. So selbstverständlich das klingen mag, ist eine heftige, frustrierend verlaufende Debatte darüber entbrannt, wer und was an der Universität gehört oder gelesen werden soll – und wer und was nicht. In diesem Essay werden zunächst die Gründe für diesen Verlauf offengelegt. Sodann wird ein Vorschlag (...) dazu gemacht, wie sich die beiden nur scheinbar konfligierenden Ziele der epistemischen Gerechtigkeit und der epistemischen Offenheit miteinander versöhnen lassen. Danach gibt es für Meinungsäußerungen, sofern sie epistemisch qualifiziert sind, keine Grenze. Wissenschaft darf sich nicht nur, sie muss sich sogar mit jedem erdenklichen Thema auseinandersetzen, da gerade sie mögliche epistemische Irrwege mit guten Argumenten beenden kann. Das Argument und der Dialog, und nicht Zensur aufgrund „sozialer Tyrannei“, sind der Weg der Wissenschaft und ihr schärfstes Schwert. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...) difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude. (shrink)

Neste texto, refletimos acerca da educação escolar no meio rural brasileiro estabelecendo interface com os direitos humanos. Para alcançar este objetivo, fazemos uma retrospectiva histórica da educação oferecida pelo Estado à população rural, demonstrando que sistematicamente tem sido direito negado do ponto de vista do acesso, da continuidade e da qualidade social do ensino. Contudo, com o processo de democratização da sociedade na década de 1980 e da emergência de movimentos sociais, é reivindicado o direito universal à educação consignado na (...) Constituição Federal de 1988 como “direito de todos e dever do Estado”. A partir de meados de 1990, uma política educacional contra-hegemônica é construída por um conjunto de atores coletivos, constituindo o Movimento Nacional de Educação do Campo, denominada de Educação do Campo. Se a grande conquista reside no marco regulatório no qual se pode visualizar uma educação que considera a identidade, especificidade e diversidade dos sujeitos do campo, isso não significa a garantia desses direitos. Do ponto de vista metodológico, a abordagem analítica desta reflexão se orienta pela perspectiva epistemológica do materialismo histórico, tendo por base de pesquisa elementos da legislação educacional brasileira e o diálogo com autores que apontam para novos horizontes da educação como direito social. Como resultado desta investigação, apontamos desafios a serem enfrentados, entre eles o consórcio dos entes federados nem sempre afinado no cumprimento do marco regulatório da Educação do Campo; poucas iniciativas de formação inicial e continuada específica para professores da Educação do Campo; estrutura material precária das escolas; o material didático-pedagógico contempla conteúdos descontextualizados e inadequados às peculiaridades locais, às vivências e necessidades dos usuários da escola; ausência de Projeto Político Pedagógico, Currículo e calendário escolar capazes de, ao mesmo tempo, dar conta de oferecer o conhecimento socialmente produzido pela humanidade e atender a diversidade, especificidade dos sujeitos com direito ao acesso à escola onde vivem e uma educação omnilateral, que não dissocia a formação humana e profissional. Concluímos identificando uma profunda brecha entre o marco regulatório da Educação do Campo conquistado e a garantia real de uma educação cidadã e profissional de qualidade a ser ofertada à população do campo. Palavras chave: Educação do Campo. Direitos Humanos. Política Pública. (shrink)

Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence (...) should be assimilated. (shrink)

Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence (...) should be assimilated. (shrink)

O texto apresenta um série de provocações diante da situação de obrigatoriedade do ensino de filosofia no nível médio da educação brasileira. A grande questão levantada é sobre a própria identidade da filosofia e do filosofar no ensino médio. A tensão entre a reflexão viva da filosofia e a tradição fica expressa na conturbada construção do lugar da filosofia no ensino médio brasileiro.

A necessidade de homens e mulheres de fé esclarecida e bem fundamentada na política tornou-se preponderante na contemporaneidade. Vive-se em um contexto em que muitos perderam a esperança e não acreditam mais na política. Na perspectiva cristã, a fé se traduz na prática do amor e é alimentada pela esperança. Não é possível sonhar com uma qualidade de vida melhor, em âmbito pessoal e coletivo, se não houver pessoas de fé na política, imbuídas dessa missão. O Movimento Nacional Fé e (...) Política – MF&P, criado em 1989, e constituído por grupos de pessoas atuantes em comunidades eclesiais, movimentos populares, partidos políticos, sindicatos e outros espaços de organização social, surgiu para promover estratégias em favor da justiça social e da dignidade humana. O trabalho é feito através da reflexão, da celebração, do aprofundamento e estudo, em grupos, seminários, retiros e encontros, tendo como lema principal, atualmente, a Cultura do Bem-Viver. O objetivo deste trabalho, a partir do material bibliográfico do MF&P e de outros pesquisadores, foi analisar o contexto do nascimento e o desenvolvimento do MF&P no Brasil. Para isso, identificou a produção editorial e o histórico dos encontros e seminários, das fases do movimento, chegando à época atual, quando, a partir de 2011, o movimento incluiu a Cultura do Bem-Viver como novo horizonte ético e político. A metodologia utilizada foi a revisão de literatura e análise do material publicado de forma impressa e também na forma digital, no site do movimento, e em publicações de membros que fazem parte do MF&P. Pode-se concluir que, através de sua história, das publicações e dos encontros regionais e nacionais, o movimento abriu perspectivas sobre novas formas de se fazer política, que contemplam e reforçam a atenção para com a ética, o cuidado, a dignidade e a justiça social. É um movimento dinâmico que contribui como um caminho para uma nova sociedade que possa usufruir de seus direitos fundamentais. (shrink)

O trabalho é um exercício de pensamento referente ao lugar da filosofia no currículo do ensino médio. A investigação considera a recente presença da filosofia como disciplina obrigatória em todas as séries da escola média brasileira. Assim, a condição curricular, e o próprio lugar do docente são ainda uma lacuna a ser preenchida. Para essa “atividade” as provocações de Hannah Arendt e de Gilles Deleuze figuram como o solo conceitual da reflexão.O exercício intelectual de Arendt sobre o “vazio de pensamento” (...) e sua rigorosa análise sobre a faculdade de pensar articuladas com as provocações de Deleuze quanto a compreensão da filosofia como uma “produtora” e articuladora de conceitos, ditaram o caminho que sugere ser a filosofia, enquanto “disciplina”, um parar para pensar como forma de contrapor o pensar ao fluxo laboral de consumo de conteúdos da escola média. Aqui a filosofia enquanto disciplina é uma contemplação tão ativa quanto a ação. (shrink)

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

v. 1. Livros e capítulos de livros -- v. 2. Artigos de periódicos -- v. 3. Eventos -- v. 4. Resenhas.

There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.

If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so doing. The difference (...) is found within determinism, Among the different kinds of motives that can influence an individual to make a choice. Furthermore, If I already possess the motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives then I increase my opportunity to realize more desires and thus increase freedom of choice, Even though my motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives is already predetermined. (shrink)

Wenn es in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts so etwas wie die "arme Verwandtschaft" unter den philosophischen Themen gab, so waren das die Gefühle. Zwar hatten sich Klassiker wie Platon, Aristoteles, Spinoza, Descartes und Hume eingehend mit ihnen befaßt, aber seit Kant, der sie als "Gegner der Vernunft" abtat, wurde den Gefühlen in der Philosophie nur noch wenig Beachtung geschenkt. Erst seit den 1960er Jahren rückten sie wieder in den Fokus des Interesses, und zwar aufgrund der Einsicht, daß Gefühle (...) kognitive mentale Zustände sind, die dazu dienen können, andere Zustände und Handlungen rational zu machen. Strittig ist indes, von welcher Art emotionale Kognitionen sind. Der Band versammelt in historisch-systematischen Einzelstudien die wichtigsten Positionen in der Philosophie der Gefühle und eignet sich gleichermaßen als umfassende Einführung in die Thematik wie auch als Seminarvorlage. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the limitations of the E-Z Reader model in its attempt to explain refixation saccades in reading. Listing factors that influence probability of refixating leads the model to assume two sorts of refixations. However, taking into account data on the metrics of refixation saccades allows us to propose an alternative explanation for empirical observations reported in the literature.

The arendtian research, with its “sui generis” style of topicing the politcs and pointing out political’s perplexities, it require our eyes one perception its researcheness logical. We are calling this logical as “tension”, it’s one hermeneutic conception which helps us in the comprehension of his work’s political reasonableness. It has been presented in its many political approaches.

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

Este artigo teve por objetivo identificar e compreender como as mulheres representam a maternidade. Para isso, foram realizadas, através de ligação telefônica, 15 entrevistas com mulheres entre 31 e 40 anos, que têm pelo menos um filho e inseridas no mercado de trabalho, utilizando para isto, um roteiro semiestruturado criado pelos pesquisadores. Através dos dados coletados, foi realizada uma análise qualitativa estruturada em duas categorias, a saber: o sentimento das participantes em relação à maternidade e a percepção da maternidade em (...) meio à outras funções, como esposa e profissional. A partir da articulação entre os relatos das entrevistas com a literatura científica utilizada, foi possível verificar que as mulheres identificam a maternidade como uma grande responsabilidade, que muitas vezes, as fazem abdicar de outras funções também importantes como esposa, profissional, ou a si mesmas enquanto pessoa. Por outro lado, também foi possível averiguar que algumas mulheres, além de representarem a maternidade como uma responsabilidade, também a entronizam como realização, expressando um sentimento de mudanças positivas em suas vidas. A partir do estudo foi possível ratificar o quanto a maternidade é valorizada pelas mulheres com filho, sendo necessário realizar mais estudos que relacionem a saúde mental de mães, com a sobrecarga e o sentimento de culpa citado por elas. (shrink)

In the modern mind the circumstance of Jewishness has been burdened with many questionable associations, particularly in the arts. Although Harold Rosenberg writes that, "in regard to art, being Jewish appears to be no more than an accident,"1 vulgar associations of Jews with art stubbornly subsist, an extreme example being Nixon's "now the worst thing is to go to anything that has to do with the arts . . . the arts, you know—they're Jews, they're left wing—in other words, stay (...) away. . . ."2 Despite the recurrence of such cloudy associations, the issue has remained curiously submerged. It is commonplace in our century to find a kind of reflexive yoking of Jews with art, particularly avant-garde art. The incalculable effects of such attitudes on modern art itself are rarely weighted. Accidental as the Jewish artist may be in his own view, he remains a somewhat suspect accident in the eyes of others. Can we continue to regard the fact of being a modern Jewish artist as "accidental," or is there a significant context which must be acknowledged? · 1. Harold Rosenberg, "Jews in Art," The New Yorker, 22 December 1975.· 2. Nixon to Haldeman: Watergate tapes, Newsweek, 19 August 1974. Dore Ashton, professor of art history at The Cooper Union, has served as the curator of art exhibitions both in the United States and abroad and as an art critic for The New York Times. She is author of, among others,Art Before Columbus, Poets and the Past, The Unknown Shore, A Reading of Modern Art, The New York School: A Cultural Reckoning, and Yes But...A Critical Study of Philip Guston. She has also contributed "On Harold Rosenberg" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Rosenberg was a chronicler and a good one, yet much of his inner dialogue was not with the present so much as the omnipresent artistic past. The central question, posed early in his life, concerned a man's individuality. Dostoyevsky had called it his "dearest" possession. At no time, even in his Marxist youth, did Rosenberg relinquish his vision of the individual as the central, most important player in any drama. Rosenberg was positively possessed with Dostoyevsky's doubts. One can hear the (...) rant of the man from the underground repeatedly in Rosenberg's written works—the stubborn hero who maintains the right even to be absurd and to "desire for himself what is positively harmful and stupid" if he claims it as a right. The right of the individual to live up to man's nature which, as Dostoyevsky said, "acts as one whole, with everything in it, conscious or unconscious" was Rosenberg's most consistent ideal. The individual he most admired, both in himself and in others, was the artist. But only in spite of everything. No one was more alert to the tartufferie that bedevils the world of the artist. Rosenberg craved sincerity with the same kind of passion for it he had found in Dostoyevsky. Art and artifact would not be a substitute for ethics and hard thought. Rosenberg's deepest conviction is revealed in his 1960 essay, "Literary Form and Social Hallucination," which begins with Dostoyevsky complaining about literature that does not lead to truth. Dore Ashton, professor of art history at The Cooper Union, is the author of numerous works, includingArt Before Columbus, Poets and the Past, A Reading Of Modern Art, and, most recently, A Fable of Modern Art. Her previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "No More than an Accident?" appeared in the Winter 1976 issue. (shrink)

Proponents of the projection strategy take an epistemic rule for the evaluation of English conditionals, the Ramsey test, as clue to the truth-conditional semantics of conditionals. They also construe English conditionals as stronger than the material conditional. Given plausible assumptions, however, the Ramsey test induces the semantics of the material conditional. The alleged link between Ramsey test and truth conditions stronger than those of the material conditional can be saved by construing conditionals as ternary, rather than binary, propositional functions with (...) a hidden contextual parameter. But such a ternary construal raises problems of its own. (shrink)

Biochemical and genetical analysis of plant transposons has shown that these elements can induce unstable mutations and also that the transposon structure can be altered in different ways. Upon insertion, a transposon can give rise to a variety of chromosomal changes in the vicinity of the insertion site. The alterations range from the nucleotide level to large‐scale rearrangements.

Many theodicists have maintained that God is justified in permitting suffering on the ground that His doing so is a necessary condition of the realization of certain intrinsically valuable ends which the suffering serves and whose value outweighs the suffering which occasions them. Examples of ends which are frequently cited in this connection are freely chosen actions in accordance with stringent obligations to be charitable and steadfast. To say that the value of these ends outweighs the suffering which gives rise (...) to them is to say that the existence both of these ends and of suffering is better than the non-existence of both. (shrink)